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Abstract—Recently, the traditional way to unlock car doors
has been replaced with a keyless entry system which proves more
convenient for automobile owners. When a driver with a key fob
is in the vicinity of the vehicle, doors automatically unlock on user
command. However, unfortunately, it has been shown that these
keyless entry systems are vulnerable to signal-relaying attacks.
While it is evident that automobile manufacturers incorporate
preventative methods to secure these keyless entry systems, they
continue to be vulnerable to a range of attacks. Relayed signals
result in valid packets that are verified as legitimate, and this
makes it is difficult to distinguish a legitimate door unlock request
from a malicious signal. In response to this vulnerability, this
paper presents an RF-fingerprinting method (coined “HOld the
DOoR”, HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systems -
the first attempt to exploit the RF-fingerprint technique in the
automotive domain. HODOR is designed as a sub-authentication
method that supports existing authentication systems for keyless
entry systems and does not require any modification of the main
system to perform. Through a series of experiments, the results
demonstrate that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks
on keyless entry systems. HODOR achieves both an average false
positive rate (FPR) of 0.27% with a false negative rate (FNR)
of 0% for the detection of simulated attacks, corresponding to
current research on keyless entry car theft. Furthermore, HODOR
was also observed under environmental factors: temperature
variation, non-line-of-sight (NLoS) conditions, and battery aging.
HODOR yields a false positive rate of 1.32% for the identification
of a legitimated key fob even under NLoS conditions. Based on
the experimental results, it is expected that HODOR will provide
a secure service for keyless entry systems, while remaining
convenient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, keyless entry systems have been developed and
installed in modern vehicles for the convenience of drivers.
Before the keyless entry system, it was necessary to physically
insert a key into the key hole to unlock the doors of a vehicle.
This traditional way to unlock doors was inconvenient as well
as vulnerable to physical key copying leading to relatively
easy automotive theft or break-ins. The keyless entry system
enables a driver to unlock doors without inserting anything, via
two distinct systems: the remote keyless entry (RKE) system
and the passive keyless entry and start (PKES) system. The
RKE system unlocks doors with the press of a button on a
remote key fob at a distance. In the PKES system, car doors
are automatically unlocked as the user makes physical contact
with a button on a door when the key fob is in the vicinity. This
implies that drivers no longer need to remove their key fobs
from their pockets or bags. We note that the PKES system
is mostly designed to include the remote lock and unlock
functions provided by the RKE system. However, as keyless
entry systems are becoming commonplace on modern vehicles,
cyber security attacks are also on the rise. Vehicle manufactur-
ers, therefore, have applied their own security mechanisms to
verify either the remotes or key fobs. In particular, encryption
with a pre-shared, long-term secret key and rolling codes [37],
[64] are common methods used to verify a legitimate key fob.
Despite these security mechanisms, several vulnerabilities
with keyless entry systems have been discovered. In 2010, the
authors of [38] demonstrated a relay attack on PKES systems,
in which vehicle doors were unlocked. In the relay attack,
two colluding adversaries would work in concert to extend
the original range of RF communication between a vehicle
and its key fob. One adversary must be close to the target
vehicle and the other must be close to its key fob. They
cooperate with each other to relay signals from the vehicle
to the key fob side. As a consequence, even outside of the
pre-defined communication range, the vehicle and its key fob
interact with each other, which leads to the unlocking of
the doors. In Germany and the United Kingdom, automotive
thieves successfully carried out these types of signal-relaying
attacks, which were captured on security cameras [10], [19]. In
addition, an adversary could exploit a particular vulnerability
of a cryptographic algorithm used in the remote keyless entry
system to extract a pre-shared secret key between the vehicle
and its key fob, thereby creating and transmitting a malicious
message for a door unlock command [22], [40], [45], [47],
[61]. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that long-term
secrets can be compromised not only in the RKE system but
also in the PKES system [66].
The underlying reason of the cyber security attacks on
the keyless entry system is that radio frequency (RF) signals
emitted from key fobs can be relayed or replayed regardless
of active security methods like encryption or authentication.
Since the keyless entry system accepts any request for authen-
tication as long as valid signals are within the communication
range, extension of the communication range by relaying or
forwarding a signal ultimately enables an attacker to unlock car
doors. One approach to resolve this issue might be the use of an
RF distance-bounding protocol that verifies the actual physical
proximity of a request [25], [44]. However, RF distance-
* Co-first Authors
Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2020
23-26 February 2020, San Diego, CA, USA
ISBN 1-891562-61-4
https://dx.doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.23107
www.ndss-symposium.org
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
13
25
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 M
ar 
20
20
bounding protocols are highly sensitive to timing errors. This is
because the distance-bounding protocol measures the distance
based on the time of flight (ToF) of an RF signal which
propagates at the speed of light. Recently, an ultra-wide band
impulse radio (UWB-IR) ranging technique has emerged as a
prominent technology to deploy a distance-bounding protocol,
and numerous efforts are underway to deploy a secure UWB-
IR ranging technique [4], [52], [57], [58]. However, this
approach would require the keyless entry system to adopt
an entirely new communication system to implement the RF
distance-bounding protocol.
To detect attacks on keyless entry systems, we employ
an RF fingerprinting technique that extracts fingerprints of
individual RF devices from their RF signals. Due to hardware
imperfections, distinct characteristics per RF device can be
extracted even if they transmit the same binary message. In
other areas, RF fingerprinting methods have already been
proposed to identify RF devices [26], [30], [31], [55], [68],
which are referred to as the ground truth of HODOR. These
existing methods were designed to identify RF devices in
line-of-sight (LoS) and indoor conditions. However, HODOR
is herein proven to function in both non-line-of-sight (NLoS)
and outdoor conditions.
In this paper, we present our evaluations of HODOR in
detecting attacks on keyless entry systems, including RKE
and PKES systems. The method has been designed as a sub-
authentication system that supports an existing authentication
system. As such, it can be directly applied to a keyless entry
system without any modification to the current communication
system. Our experimental results show that HODOR precisely
and accurately detects several types of attack attempts. The
detailed contributions of this research are as follows.
• Based on previous attack demonstrations conducted in
existing research, we present a new attack model that
combines all known attack methods; our attack model
covers both PKES and RKE systems. This is the first
attempt to formalize existing attacks on keyless entry
systems.
• We present an RF fingerprinting method, HODOR,
to identify legitimate key fobs and detect malicious
attempts defined in our attack model. HODOR can be
easily employed by adding a new device that captures
and analyzes the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band RF
signals emitted from a key fob, which implies that the
current system would require no alterations.
• We performed a series of experiments to evaluate
HODOR. We simulated malicious attacks that are de-
fined in our attack model with different kinds of RF
devices. The experimental results show that HODOR
is able to correctly detect the attacks, which has an
average FPR of 0.27% with an FNR of 0% for the
PKES system.
• HODOR was also evaluated under varying environmen-
tal factors, such as temperature variations, NLoS con-
ditions (e.g., a key fob placed in a pocket) and battery
aging. We show that the features we present work
properly under these environmental factors, indicating
that HODOR can be applied in current commonly
existing systems.
(a) Message flow of PKES system
(b) Message flow of RKE system
Fig. 1: Message flow of each keyless entry system
II. BACKGROUND
To easily understand HODOR and our attack model, we
describe the background of keyless entry systems and digital
communication.
A. Keyless Entry Systems
When a vehicle is equipped with a PKES system, a driver
can unlock their doors as long as he/she is in the vicinity of
their vehicle. In some cases, a driver must also press a button
on the vehicle. Mutual communication between the key fob
and vehicle is needed to verify whether the driver is actually
nearby. The vehicle then sends a challenge to the key fob via
low frequency (LF) band (125 ∼ 135kHz) communication,
and the corresponding key fob responds to the request via
UHF-band communication. Fig. 1a illustrates an example of
the message flow for verification in the PKES system. Vehicles
periodically broadcast LF signals to check if a proper key fob
is in the vicinity, like beacon signals [41]. In the case that
a key fob is within the communication range of an LF band
(e.g., 1 ∼ 2m), it receives a periodical LF-band signal from
the vehicle which enables it to transmit the response signal
in a UHF band. In North America, 315MHz is assigned for
the UHF-band, whereas 433.92MHz or 868MHz is assigned in
Europe [40]. For security reasons, packets are encrypted with
a long-term secret key that is shared between a remote key
fob and its corresponding vehicle in advance. It is noted that
in the PKES system, a driver is even able to start the engine
without inserting a physical key into the ignition switch.
In an RKE system, UHF-band signals from the key fob are
transmitted unidirectionally. Only when the driver presses the
button on the key fob is the UHF-band signal transmitted. Fig.
1b illustrates an example of the messages flow for verification
in the RKE system. The transmission of the same RF signals
from a remote key fob is repeated multiple times to increase
the reliability of communication [40].
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Fig. 2: An example of FSK and ASK modulation
B. Digital Communication
The information source (i.e., binary code) is encoded to be
delivered via wireless communication. Next, encoded binary
information is mapped into a symbol and conveyed to an
analog RF signal (the so-called baseband signal) through
various modulation schemes. Frequency shift keying (FSK)
and amplitude shift keying (ASK) modulation are the most
common methods for modulating RF signals in keyless entry
systems. Specifically, symbol consists of several bits. But in the
case of Binary-ASK and Binary-FSK where a symbol consists
of a single bit, the meaning can be seen as interchangeable.
Since most keyless entry systems use BFSK or BASK, for the
remainder of this paper, we will use the terms interchangeably.
BFSK expresses bits 0 and 1 by shifting the frequency
of the baseband signal by a specific frequency deviation based
on the center frequency fc. The center frequency fc means the
frequency of the carrier signal. A carrier signal is a sinusoidal
wave with a carrier frequency. This carrier frequency is defined
as standard according to its application and region. That is, fc
of a UHF-band signal is 315MHz or 433.92MHz and fc of an
LF-band signal is 125 ∼ 135Khz. Fig. 2 shows an example of
one FSK and one ASK modulated signal corresponding to the
binary code. In FSK modulation, if a sinusoidal wave of the
frequency fc + fd, which is higher than the center frequency
by fd indicates bit 1, a sinusoidal wave having a frequency
of fc − fd, which is lower than the center frequency by fd,
indicates bit 0. The fd indicates the frequency deviation. BASK
expresses 0 and 1 bits using the amplitude of sinusoidal with
center frequency fc. If a sine wave having an amplitude of
A0 indicates bit 1, a sine wave having an amplitude of 0
indicates bit 0. Finally, the baseband signal is mixed with a
carrier signal and transmitted through an antenna. Since a high-
frequency electric signal is emitted from the antenna, the RF
signal can be physically transmitted through the air in the form
of an electromagnetic wave. At the receiver side, the received
signal is processed through a mixer, demodulator, and decoder
- reverse order of the transmission process. We refer readers
to [59] for further reading on digital communication.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
This section presents the system overview, including how
HODOR detects malicious attacks on keyless entry systems. For
Fig. 3: System model
a clear understanding of HODOR, we define the attack model
that simulates the actions of adversaries and their capabilities.
A. System Overview
In this subsection, we present the system overview of
HODOR. The vehicle should verify the UHF-band signals emit-
ted from the key fob. Therefore, HODOR should be equipped
with an RF receiver and mounted to the vehicle and integrated
with the Body Control Module (BCM) of a car which controls
various electronic accessories in the car’s body. One typical
function of BCM is transmitting a lock/unlock command
packet through the in-vehicle network communication such as
CAN or LIN. In the case of an attack being detected, HODOR
raises an attack detection alarm and BCM does not transmit
the CAN packet which contains the unlock command. Fig. 3
illustrates the overall system model of HODOR.
B. Attack Models
We present a new attack model for PKES systems. Our
attack model covers attacks on PKES systems, which were
implemented with the LF/UHF band RFID communication. In
addition, our attack model also covers existing demonstrations
of attacks on RKE systems using UHF band RFID communica-
tion. In our attack model, the main objective of a hypothetical
adversary is to unlock a vehicle. For the simplicity of the attack
model, we excluded other functions, such as an engine start
message. In addition, physical damage to a vehicle is beyond
the scope of our attack model, regardless of whether doors
are successfully unlocked via a malicious message. Three
different types of attacks on PKES systems were outlined in
our attack model in regards to how an adversary might deliver
a valid message that enables the agent to unlock doors. For
a relay attack, we categorized these into Single-band relay
attack and Dual-band relay attack. Two adversaries must
collaborate to accomplish either a single-band or dual-band
relay attack because relayed signals are used in this model
to extend communication range. In a Cryptographic attack,
however, there is a single adversary who attempts to unlock
doors on the keyless entry system. In addition to the attack
model on the PKES system, we also considered an attack
model for the RKE system. In Attacks on RKE system, we
demonstrate that all known attacks on RKE systems can be
grouped into the two categories.
1) Single-band relay attacks: In the PKES system, a
vehicle transmits a verification request to the corresponding
key fob using the LF-band RFID communication. When the
request is received in the LF band, the key fob automatically
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responds in the UHF band. The PKES system was originally
intended to only operate within the LF-band communication
range (e.g., 1 ∼ 2 meters). However, by relaying an LF-band
request from a vehicle to its key fob, an adversary is able to
make a key fob respond to a request within the UHF-band
communication range (e.g., up to 200 meters) even if it is out
of the LF-band communication range. It should be noted that
the communication range of a key fob differs per manufacturer.
In essence, a single-band relay attack aims to relay an LF-band
request to the key fob, in which case the UHF-band response
for the LF-band request is directly transmitted to the vehicle.
In other words, the UHF-band response is not relayed and is
transmitted within its communication range. This paper focuses
on the UHF-band RF signals emitted from key fobs, and, as
such, does not consider how the LF-band signals are relayed
to the key fobs.
2) Dual-band relay attacks: Unlike a single-band relay
attack, a dual-band relay attack is not only able to relay
a request from the vehicle within the LF band, but also a
response from a key fob within the UHF band. Accordingly,
in a dual-band relay attack, the PKES system can be attacked
even if the key fob is much farther away from the vehicle
during a single-band relay attack. Adversaries intending to
commit a dual-band attack must also possess industry-standard
equipment in order to relay both the LF-band and the UHF-
band RF signals. The UHF-band signals can be delivered to the
vehicle by a signal-extending module [10], [19], or through two
adversaries, one who would record and forward the UHF-band
signal out of communication range and the other who would
inject the forwarded signal into the vehicle [18]. We denote the
former as an Amplification attack and the latter as a Digital
relay attack. The difference between the two attack types
is whether the adversaries perform digital communication to
forward binary information contained in LF/UHF-band signals.
During an Amplification attack, adversaries simply am-
plify both the LF band and the UHF-band signals using the
RF amplifier. There are two ways to inject UHF-band signals
to the vehicle. First, the adversary at the key fob side amplifies
the UHF-band signals and directly injects it into the vehicle.
Second, both adversaries amplify the UHF-band signals. Al-
though the latter case can produce a higher signal strength than
the former, the RF amplifier intensifies both the pass-band
signal and the noise leading to unintended feature variation.
Therefore, in Section V, we have simulated an amplification
attack based on the former case. In a Digital relay attack, ad-
versaries perform the whole process of digital communication
to inject an attack signal. Adversaries demodulate and decode
the LF/UHF-band signal to forward binary information to each
other. The delivery of binary information can be conducted
through various wireless communication systems such as Wi-
Fi or Bluetooth. After receiving the binary information, the
adversary injects an attack signal through an encoding and
modulation process. The advantage of a digital relay attack is
that the communication range can be much larger than with a
single-band relay attack or amplification attack. This is because
binary information is forwarded through state-of-the-art digital
communication. However, since most PKES systems assign
a maximum delay [38], the attack signal should be injected
within the maximum delay period. Nevertheless, researchers
have shown that digital relay attacks can be successfully
mounted with cheap RF devices [18].
3) Cryptographic attacks: An adversary can extend the
communication range between a vehicle and its key fob, as
well as mount a cryptographic attack. In a cryptographic attack,
the adversary exploits the weaknesses of the cryptographic
algorithm which is equipped in the PKES system. In the
vicinity of the key fob, the adversary injects malicious LF-band
signals (challenge) to the key fob and collects the UHF-band
signals (response). Due to the lack of mutual authentication
in the PKES system, the key fob accepts malicious LF-band
signals and transmits corresponding responses. After collecting
sufficient challenge and response pairs, the adversary performs
cryptanalysis to extract a long-term secret key. Consequently,
the adversary can inject valid UHF-band signals depending
on a challenge signal from the vehicle. A 2018 study has
shown that the PKES system of Telsa Model S is equipped
with a weak cryptographic algorithm and does not require
mutual authentication [66]. Researchers have uncovered that
the outdated proprietary cipher DST40 has been mounted to
the Telsa Model S. Furthermore, unrevealed PKES systems
with weak cryptographic algorithms or key management failure
[40] are also expected to be vulnerable to a cryptograhic attack,
given that the adversary extracts the binary code and injects the
attack signal. With regards to HODOR, this attack scenario is
considered to be the same as the transmitted signal that would
be analyzed in a digital relay attack.
4) Attacks on RKE systems: We categorized the attacks
on PKES systems as Single-Band Relay, Dual-Band Relay,
and Cryptographic Attack. In addition, previous studies have
shown that where a long-term secret key is used in an RKE
system, it can be compromised by an adversary through the
use of cryptanalysis with reverse engineering [22], [24], [45],
[61], an exhaustive key search [47], [63], or combining both
methods [40]. As a result, an adversary can generate a valid
packet in a similar manner to a cryptographic attack. To the
best of our knowledge, our cryptographic attack model also
covers all known attacks on RKE systems except a rolljam
attack. In a rolljam attack, an adversary performs a jamming
attack and eavesdrops on valid UHF signals. When the driver
presses the unlock button on the key fob, the vehicle remains
locked because the signal has been blocked by the jamming
attack, and the driver will naturally attempt to unlock the door
again. This creates a second signal that is also recorded and
blocked, however, at this time, the adversary replays the first
code to unlock the door. As a result, the driver assumes that
the key fob is working normally. However, the adversary can
now inject an attack signal using a second rolling code which
has not been received by the vehicle.
IV. OUR METHOD: HODOR
A. Overview
In this section, we explain our design decisions to realize
HODOR. Fig. 4 shows an overview of HODOR’s architecture.
HODOR aims at detecting an attack signal using a classifier
which is generated by legitimate signals only. There are two
main phases in HODOR: the Training phase and the Attack
Detection phase. In the Training phase, HODOR creates a clas-
sifier based on a training dataset which contains only legitimate
signals. Through preprocessing and feature extraction, a set
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Fig. 4: Overview of HODOR architecture
of features per RF signal are obtained and the classifier is
trained. In addition, normalization parameters, which are used
for output normalization in the Attack Detection phase, are
computed. After the classifier is trained, in the Attack Detection
phase, HODOR is now able to detect any attacks defined in
our attack model in Section III-B. In the Attack Detection
phase, HODOR receives a new RF signal which contains a
door unlock request. Then, HODOR conducts preprocessing and
feature extraction on this newly received RF signal, as outlined
in the Training phase. The extracted feature set is used as
input to the trained classifier, and HODOR makes a decision
whether the received RF signal has been transmitted from a
legitimate key fob or not. This decision is made based on the
normalized output of the classifier and a pre-defined threshold.
In an invalid case, when the normalized output is larger than
the threshold, the corresponding door unlock request is not
validated and HODOR alerts the BCM module.
B. Preprocessing
At the outset, HODOR receives UHF-band RF signals,
which become preprocessed as illustrated in Fig. 5. The
received signal, including a carrier signal c(t), a baseband
signal s(t), and channel noise n(t), is denoted as follows.
r(t) = s(t)⊗ c(t) + n(t) (1)
where ⊗ is the operation for the mixer. The carrier signal is
a sinusoidal signal at the carrier frequency (fc) of the UHF
band. To obtain meaningful information for analysis located
in the baseband signal, the carrier signal must be removed.
In other words, the received raw signal is shifted back down
to the baseband by mixing the sinusoidal signal at the same
carrier frequency as follows.
r[t]⊗ c[t] = s[t] + n[t]⊗ c[t] (2)
It should be noted that HODOR samples a continuous analog
RF signal, and owing to this, we denote the sampled signal
as [t] which represents discrete values. To remove n[t]⊗ c[t],
the bandpass filter is performed on r[t]⊗ c[t]. As a result, we
obtain the baseband signal s[t] from the received signal r[t].
Subsequently, HODOR demodulates the baseband signal s[t]
into a pulse signal d[t]. The pulse signal is encoded from a
binary code. As mentioned in Section III-B, FSK and ASK
are typical modulation schemes used in keyless entry systems,
which are determined by manufacturers. After demodulation,
Fig. 5: Preprocessing block diagram
the pulse signal is normalized to scale its power to a certain
value. Since the received signal strength (RSS) is determined
by a channel condition, it would be difficult to reliably extract
the features under noisy channel conditions. To be independent
to the degree of RSS, HODOR applies root-mean-square (RMS)
normalization, through which the power of a demodulated
signal is scaled as 1. For example, if d[t] is composed of
N samples (d1, d2, ..., dN ), the RMS-normalized signal is
calculated as follows.
dRMS [t] =
d[t]√∑N
i=1 d
2
i
N
(3)
C. Feature Extraction
On the preprocessed signals, HODOR extracts salient fea-
tures by which a legitimate request and a malicious attempt
are distinct. In wireless transmissions, the radio preamble
(sometimes called a header) is used to synchronize the clock
between a transceiver and a receiver. Preamble has a static bit
sequence independent of the data packet. HODOR extracts the
features from the preamble of the pulse signal since it allows
HODOR to extract features independent of the data and the key
fob. We propose four types of features: i) peak frequency, ii)
frequency offset, iii) SNR, and iv) a set of statistical features.
Peak frequency. Peak frequency is a feature in a frequency
domain. Since the preamble part of a time-domain pulse signal
is given, it must be transformed to the frequency-domain signal
by fast fourier transform (FFT). Fig. 6 shows the preamble part
of the UHF-band RF signal transmitted from a key fob and its
FFT result. It can be seen that several dominant peaks exist
in the frequency-domain preamble signal. The peak frequency
(fpeak) is the frequency where the highest amplitude value
exists as follows.
fpeak = arg max
f
|DRMS [f ]| (4)
where DRMS [f ] is the FFT result of dRMS [t]. The peak
frequency feature is affected by a clock source used for micro
controllers. Because of the imperfection of clock sources,
different peak frequency values can be extracted from different
RF devices. Accordingly, this feature is used to distinguish
a legitimate key fob from other devices used for malicious
attacks.
Carrier frequency offset. Carrier frequency offset is
another feature in the frequency domain of a preamble signal.
Different from peak frequency, carrier frequency offset is the
feature that is extracted from the baseband signal s[t] which is
shown in Fig. 2. As each key fob has a non-ideal (i.e., deviated
from 433.92MHz) carrier frequency (f ′c) due to the hardware
imperfection, the RF receiver works on a wide band to reliably
receive signals from the key fob [67] in a real vehicle. This
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Preamble signal in time and frequency domains:
(a) Preamble signal in time domain, (b) Preamble signal in
frequency domain
imperfection also occurs in the receiver, which leads the non-
ideal frequency of f ′′c when generating c(t). Consequently,
when the r(t) is mixed with c(t), the baseband signal (s[t]) in
Equation (2) has a different frequency offset value (f ′c − f ′′c )
according to each transmitter and receiver pair. We exploit this
frequency difference as a feature to verify legitimate key fobs
and denote it as foffsetc .
SNR. Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is a measure that com-
pares the level of a desired signal to the level of background
noise. SNR is defined as the ratio of signal power to noise
power. In addition, SNR is expressed in decibels (dB) as
follows.
SNRdB = 10 log10
Psignal
Pnoise
(5)
Where Psignal is the power of a demodulated signal (i.e.,
meaningful information) and Pnoise is the power of back-
ground noise (i.e., unwanted signal). It is noted that measures
greater than 0 dB indicate more signal than noise. In the PKES
system, a UHF-band RF signal emitted at a larger distance than
the proximity distance should be considered malicious even if
the signal is from the legitimate key fob. Since a feature of
SNR is easily affected by channel conditions, path loss, or
the reduction in power density of a signal as it propagates
through space, can be estimated. By analyzing the features of
SNR, HODOR is able to verify whether a particular signal has
been generated within a specific vicinity.
Statistical features. To support the above features, a set
of statistical features were also employed. Statistical features
represent the various characteristics of a sampled signal. As
a result, numerous studies on signal processing and wireless
communication area employed statistical features for node or
channel identification [33], [34], [54]. Since the hardware
characteristics of an attack device and channel condition
affect the signal characteristics, we employed the statistical
features to differentiate an attack signal. With the three crafted
features and 20 statistical features used in [33], we ran a
feature selection algorithm to eliminate features that are not
beneficial to performance. From there, we selected the top
five highest performing features and decided to not employ
all 23 while testing HODOR in consideration of execution
time during the feature extraction phase. As more features are
used, more time is required to compute the features, and this
time delay hinders driver convenience. Moreover, the risk of
an overfitting problem can when a large number of features
are included, and thus, we performed an exhaustive feature
selection by limiting the number to five [42]. Interestingly, all
of the crafted features were selected by the feature selection
algorithm and the remaining two features were kurtosis and
spectral brightness. Table I shows the features selected for
HODOR according to the modulation scheme. Kurtosis is a
measure of the peakedness of the sampled signal in the time
domain. As the signal propagates through the air, noise signals
and multipath signals affect signal quality. In addition, since
the passband signal and noise signals are also intensified by an
analog amplifier, and external amplification affects the kurtosis
of the signal. Therefore, single-band relay and amplification
attacks inhere greater kurtosis values than a legitimate signal.
The kurtosis is calculated as follows.
Kurtosis = E
[(
dRMS − µ
σ
)4]
(6)
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of
the dRMS , respectively. Spectral brightness is the amount of
spectral energy corresponding to frequencies higher than a
given cut-off threshold. In a playback attack, the adversary
records the legitimate signal. In this process,the baseband
RF signal goes through an analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
and is digitally sampled. However, digital sampling introduces
a quantization error due to the sampling rate and vertical
resolution of ADC. When the attack is mounted, these sam-
ples go through a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) and are
reconstructed to an analog baseband signal. At this point, the
quantization error introduced during digital sampling affects
the spectral density of the reconstructed signal [65]. Spectral
brightness is calculated as follows.
SpectralBrightness =
0.5×fs∑
f=fth
|DRMS [f ]|2 (7)
where fth is the threshold frequency and fs is the sampling
frequency. In our evaluation, we assigned fth as 0.1× fs.
TABLE I: Features used for each modulation scheme
Modulation
Scheme
FSK ASK
Selected
Features
fpeak
Kurtosis
Spec. Brightness
SNRdB
fpeak
Kurtosis
foffsetc
Spec. Brightness
SNRdB
D. Training and Attack Detection
Before attack detection, HODOR requires a one-class clas-
sifier, which facilitates attack detection. One-class classifiers
are trained with a set of features derived exclusively from a
legitimate key fob. Feature extraction during training can only
occur via the legitimate key fobs, and as such, the classifiers
are created via semi-supervised learning. Table I shows the
features used for each modulation scheme. After the classifiers
are trained, HODOR assigns a threshold for each classifier.
Considering implementation in a real vehicle, it is necessary
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Algorithm 1 Attack detection for the PKES
system
1: function SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING (S: A SET OF
SIGNALS)
2: for i=1 to |S| do
3: dRMS ← preprocessing (si) (si ∈ S)
4: N iPKES ← FeatureExtraction (dRMS , FPKES)
5: /* F : Selected features */
6: /* N : Extracted feature set */
7: end for
8: CPKES ← Training (NPKES)
9: µPKES , σPKES ← NPC (NPKES)
10: /* C : Classifier */
11: return CPKES , µPKES , σPKES
12: end function
13: function PKES SYSTEM ATTACK DETECTION (s: RE-
CEIVED SIGNAL)
14: dRMS ← preprocessing (s)
15: NPKES ← Feature Extraction (dRMS , FPKES)
16: OPKES ← CPKES (NPKES)
17: OPKES ← |OPKES−µPKES |σPKES
18: if OPKES > ΓPKES then /* Γ : Threshold */
19: return Reject /*Attack*/
20: else
21: return Accept /*No Attack*/
22: end if
23: end function
to assign equal thresholds to a specific key fob model. For this
requirement, HODOR performs z-normalization on the output
of the classifier, to compensate for the difference of feature
distribution between the key fobs. Z-normalization calculates
a z-score which has a distribution with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. To set a normalization parameter mean
and standard deviation, inspired by the k-fold cross validation
[51], HODOR randomly selects 90 percent of the legitimate
data set for training and 10 percent of the legitimate data
for testing. After repeating 10 times to accumulate the output
of the legitimate test data, HODOR calculates the mean (µ)
and standard deviation (σ) of the corresponding key fob. We
denote this process as Normalization Parameter Calculation
(NPC). In the attack detection phase, output (x) of a classifier
from a newly received signal is normalized as |x−µ|σ . If any
output from the classifier is not within the indicated threshold
(Γ), the corresponding input is considered malicious. We set
an adequate threshold for each keyless entry system through
evaluation, as shown in the following chapter. Finally, HODOR
rejects the door unlock request if at least one classifier is
deemed malicious. Algorithm 1 illustrates HODOR operation
during training and attack detection.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we report the evaluation results for HODOR
to show that the system accurately detects attacks defined in
Section III-B. In addition, we performed further evaluations to
demonstrate how HODOR handles environmental factors, such
as temperature variations, NLoS conditions, and battery aging.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Experimental setup for single-band relay attack sim-
ulation: (a) Signal acquisition setup on the vehicle side, (b)
LF-band signal relay using a loop antenna and SMA cable
Fig. 8: Output distributions of k-NN and SVM algorithms as
a function of distance in a single-band relay attack
A. Experimental Setup
Keyless Entry System. We performed a series of ex-
periments on actual vehicles, a 2014 Kia Soul and 2016
Volkswagen Tiguan. Both vehicle models are equipped with
a PKES system. In the case of the Soul, an FSK modulation
was employed, and a center frequency of 433.92MHz with
a frequency deviation of 30kHz was assigned for UHF-band
RF communication. In the Tiguan, ASK modulation with a
center frequency of 433.92MHz was employed for UHF-band
RF communication.
RF Signal Receiver and Transmitter. For the evaluation
of HODOR, two types of software-defined radio (SDR) devices
were used for the transmission and acquisition of the UHF-
band RF signals. SDR is a radio communication system
that replaces hardware components with a software module.
HackRF One [39] was used to sample the UHF-band RF
signals, and the other HackRF One coupled with a universal
software radio peripheral (USRP) X310 [17] was used to
generate UHF-band RF signals that were to be simulated as
attack signals. With GNU Radio [23], the preprocessing phase
of HODOR was implemented in virtual hardware components.
We set the sample rate of SDR to 5M samples/s in both vehicle
models. Since specification of the communication system is
different for the two vehicle models, we assigned different
parameters for each vehicle. The key fob of the Kia Soul
was implemented with a bit rate of 3kbps and a frequency
deviation of 30kHz using FSK modulation. As a result, the
frequency range of the baseband signal begins at 27kHz to
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Fig. 9: Experimental setup for amplification attack simulation
on the key fob side
33kHz. Ideally, the transition width of a filter should be zero.
However, since the practical communication system has an
inevitable frequency offset, the receiver must be designed with
a wider bandwidth than in ideal scenarios. Accordingly, we set
the bandwdith of the bandpass filter to have greater margins
and found the specific parameter heuristically. Therefore, we
set the high, low cut-off frequencies and transition width of
the bandpass filter to 15kHz, 45kHz, and 10kHz respectively.
On the other hand, the key fob of the Volkswagen Tiguan
uses a MEGAMOS ID 48 transceiver [62] which utilizes ASK
modulation with a bit rate of 3.5kbps. Therefore, the baseband
signal of a Tiguan has a 7kHz bandwidth. As with the KIA
Soul, considering the frequency offset that occurs in a practical
system, we set the cut-off frequency of the lowpass filter as
20kHz. In addition, the LF-band RF signals were relayed by
an SMA cable [15] and a loop antenna [14] to simulate the
relay attack. Finally, three RF amplifiers were used to simulate
an amplification attack, in which the communication range of a
key fob was extended. In our experimental setup, we confirmed
that the vehicle verifies an attack signal as legitimate in every
trial.
Classification Algorithm. Classification algorithms are
usually categorized as one-class or multi-class classification.
Since it is impossible to train for all cases of malicious attacks
before they occur, the classifiers should be trained with a set of
features from a legitimate key fob only. In other words, a semi-
supervised one-class classification is needed for HODOR to
cover unknown attacks. In our evaluation, a one-class support
vector machine (SVM) and k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) algo-
rithms were used [49]. The SVM and k-NN algorithms were
performed with the default parameters provided by MatLab
2017a [16]. More specifically, a residual basis function (RBF)
was used for SVM algorithms, and standardized euclidean
distance was applied for k-NN algorithms, whose parameter
k was set to 1. For each classifier, we collected a set of 100
UHF-band RF signals from a legitimate key fob from a one-
meter distance, and the classifiers were trained with them. As
with the training data set, we collected a set of 100 attack
signals in every attack simulation.
Performance Metric. Statistical measures of classification
test performance were measured by standard metrics, such
as true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR), false
positive rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR) [42]. In our
evaluation, TP refers to the case in which HODOR identified an
attack signal as an attack. Alternatively, TN refers to the case
in which HODOR considered a legitimate signal as legitimate.
FP refers to the case in which HODOR considered a legitimate
signal as an attack and FN refers to the case in which HODOR
Fig. 10: Output distribution of the k-NN and SVM algorithms
as a function of amplifiers in an amplification attack
Fig. 11: Experimental setup for digital relay attack simulation
considered an attack signal as legitimate. It would only take
one FN case in the keyless entry system to cause a car theft.
Owing to this, we set the objective FNR as 0%, under the
belief that FNR should take precedence over FPR.
B. Single-Band Relay Attack Detection
To simulate the single-band relay attack, we relayed the
LF-band signals to trigger a key fob even if it is out of the LF-
band communication range. An SMA cable and RF amplifier
were used to minimize the path loss of the LF-band signals.
We then sampled the UHF-band RF signals emitted from a
key fob, varying the distance between the vehicle and the
key fob (5m, 10m, and 15m). Fig. 7 shows the experimental
setup for the single-band relay attack simulation. HackRF One
is located on the vehicle side and controlled by a laptop.
Since the signal attenuation becomes larger as the distance
increases, we utilized RF amplifiers to increase LF-band signal
strength to relay it to the key fob located more than 10 meters
away. It should be noted that the maximum range that the
UHF-band signal in the PKES system could transmit was
at most 15m in our experimental setup. In addition, we set
the distance between HackRF One and the key fob to one
meter under LoS conditions for capturing legitimate signals.
Fig. 8 shows the output distribution of the k-NN and SVM
algorithms as a function of distance. Due to the nature of the
PKES system, a transmission from an out-of-range key fob is
considered an attack on the PKES system. For the UHF-band
RF signals measured at a distance of 5m, the k-NN and SVM
algorithms both output an FPR of 0%, with an FNR of 0%
at thresholds (ΓPKES) of 4 and 5, respectively. Furthermore,
both algorithms with the same threshold output an FPR of 0%,
with an FNR of 0% where the UHF-band RF signals were
captured at distances of 10 or 15m. As the distance increased,
it became easier to detect a single-band relay attack. Thus, we
8
Fig. 12: Output distribution of the k-NN and SVM algorithms
as a function of devices in a digital relay attack
conclude that HODOR is able to effectively detect single-band
relay attacks.
C. Dual-Band Relay Attack Detection
We evaluate attack detection performance against two types
of dual-band attacks, (i.e., amplification attack, digital relay
attack) which are mentioned in Section III-B.
1) Amplification attacks: Since a single-band relay attack
is only possible within the communication range of a key
fob, a victim might easily become suspicious of foul play.
To avoid alerting their victims, adversaries are more likely to
adapt a dual-band attack strategy. A dual-band relay attack
involves relaying the UHF-band signals of a key fob as
well as the LF-band signals of a vehicle. Even though a
key fob is placed out of the communication range, a dual-
band relay attack can still successfully unlock doors. In our
experiments, we first applied RF amplifiers to extend the UHF-
band communication range. In an amplification attack scenario,
the adversary amplifies and forwards the UHF-band signals to
the vehicle. To minimize the path loss between the key fob and
RF amplifier, we directly place the RF amplifier next to the
key fob. Therefore, the UHF-band RF signals were transmitted
much longer distances than the original communication range
permitted. Fig. 9 shows the relay module for the amplification
attack simulation. The 12V battery pack supplies DC voltage
to the amplifier, and the experimental setup on the vehicle
side is identical Fig. 7. Deviating slightly from the attack
model in Section III-B, for experimental convenience, we
relayed the LF-band signal using an SMA cable. Since HODOR
only analyzes the UHF-band signal, this experimental setup
is equivalent to an amplification attack model. We employed
several Low Noise Amplifiers (LNA) on the UHF band in
a commercial market. Each amplifier (Amp #1, Amp #2,
Amp #3) used for the attack simulation had 30dB, 60dB
and 64dB gains, respectively [1]–[3]. As mentioned in Section
III-B, HODOR sampled the amplified UHF-band signals, which
had been directly injected by the adversary on the key fob
side. We assumed that the adversary can adjust the SNR level
using a high-quality amplifier or directional antenna, and set
the distance between the adversary and vehicle to the point
where the SNR level is equal to that of legitimate signals. This
implies that when the adversary injects the attack signal with
TABLE II: Output distribution of a digital relay attack against
the PKES system of the Kia Soul
Algorithm
Legitimate
Device
Output Distribution (mean / std) FPR
(%)
#1 Key fob #2 Key fob #3 Key fob #1 SDR #2 SDR
k-NN
#2 Key fob
22.29
/1.7
0.97
/0.63
11.72
/1.76
2.32e+7
/1.15e+7
2.42e+7
/1.15e+7
0.19
#3 Key fob
8.89
/1.49
12.31
/1.96
0.91
/0.49
1.21e+7
/6.77e+6
1.61e+7
/6.06e+6
0.29
SVM
#2 Key fob
81.16
/6.47
0.91
/0.9
33.32
/5.68
153.12
/2.28e-13
158.03
/1.99e-13
3.23
#3 Key fob
15.56
/3.57
24.48
/4.92
0.6
/0.55
94.91
/1.14e-13
96.73
/8.56e-14
1.17
TABLE III: Output distribution of a digital relay attack against
the PKES system of the Volkswagen Tiguan
Algorithm LegitimateDevice
Output Distribution (mean / std) FPR
(%)
#1 Key fob #2 Key fob #1 SDR #2 SDR
k-NN #1 Key fob
18.24
/12.77
123.22
/2.77
130.03
/4.34
121.8
/3.14 0
#2 Key fob 140.74/3.83
11.72
/15.72
112.97
/13.61
112.97
/13.62 0
SVM #1 Key fob
21.52
/16.62
133.24
/0.49
134.72
/0.47
133.6
/0.58 0
#2 Key fob 119.58/0.02
20.07
/27.76
118.74
/0.46
118.74
/0.46 0
a higher SNR than the legitimate signal, HODOR can easily
detect an amplification attack. We found that the adversary
can achieve the same SNR level as the legitimate signal at a
distance of between 20 and 25 meters. Then, we sampled the
forwarded signals on the vehicle side. Fig. 10 shows the output
distributions of the k-NN and SVM algorithms as a function of
the amplifiers. As seen in Fig. 10, even if the distance between
the key fob and vehicle is larger than the maximum distance of
a single-band relay attack, the normalized output distance/score
is much closer to the legitimate case. Nevertheless, the k-NN
and SVM algorithms both output an FPR of 0% and FNR of
0% at thresholds (ΓPKES) of 4 and 5, respectively. Therefore,
HODOR is still able to effectively detect amplification attacks.
2) Digital relay attacks: To simulate a digital relay attack,
we extracted binary information from the ACK signal in
Fig. 1a. Then, attack signals were injected according to the
modulation scheme of the target PKES system using SDR
devices. The ACK signal of each key fob contains unique,
but static binary information. When the vehicle receives the
ACK signal, a number of ECUs are activated to transmit the
CAN packets. This standby function is implemented in modern
vehicles for enhanced driver convenience [28]. Based on this
observation, and by checking the in-vehicle network (i.e., CAN
bus), we confirmed that the vehicle accepts the attack signal. In
addition to the SDR devices, we further extended the capability
of the digital relay adversary. The strongest adversary would, in
theory, be one with access to identical electronic components
as the target key fob. In practice, though, the assumption
that the digital relay adversary would have the exact same
electronic components might be perceived as overly cautious.
However, we also evaluated HODOR against this well-equipped,
but highly unlikely, hypothetical super adversary. For the Kia
Soul, one key fob out of three used in the experiment was
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Fig. 13: Output distribution of the k-NN and SVM algorithms
as a function of SDR devices in an playback attack on a PKES
system
chosen as legitimate. The remaining two key fobs and two
SDR devices were used to simulate malicious UHF-band RF
packets. For example, if the #1 key fob were to be chosen as
legitimate, features from the other key fobs would be assumed
as an attack. For the Volkswagen Tiguan, one key fob out
of the two was chosen as legitimate and the remaining key
fob and two SDR devices were used to simulate an attack.
Fig. 11 shows the experimental setup for a digital relay attack
simulation. HackRF One was used for signal acquisition, and
the USRP and another HackRF One was used for signal
injection. All of these SDR devices were controlled by a
laptop. The UHF-band RF signals corresponding to the packets
were then sampled and analyzed by HODOR. Fig. 12 shows the
output distributions of k-NN and SVM algorithms as a function
of devices used in the simulation of digital relay attacks on the
Kia Soul, when the #1 key fob was used as a training set. As
shown in Fig. 12, Table II, and Table III, the output from the
remaining remote key fobs is closer to that of a legitimate one
than to the output from the SDR devices. Especially, features
from the #3 key fob of the Soul are closer to that of the #1
key fob than to other devices. This is because the two key fobs
were manufactured in the same year and month. In the case of
the Soul, the k-NN and SVM algorithms output produced an
average FPR of 0.65% and an average FPR of 0.27% with an
FNR of 0% at thresholds (ΓPKES) of 4 and 5, respectively.
In the case of the Tiguan, the k-NN and SVM algorithms
both output an average FPR of 0% with an FNR of 0% at a
threshold (ΓPKES) of 70 for both. In addition, as mentioned
in Section III-B, a cryptographic attack can also be simulated
in the same way. Therefore, we also verified that HODOR
can effectively detect a cryptographic attack against a PKES
system. As a result, HODOR successfully filtered legitimate
and malicious requests from both the amplified and replayed
messages. Accordingly, we conclude that HODOR is able to
effectively detect dual-band relay attacks and cryptographic
attacks.
D. Playback Attack Detection
During an advanced attack, it is possible that an adversary
might attempt to playback the sampled signals whose features
most closely resemble the target key fob. This type of attack
is a potential threat in PKES systems. For example, an the
attack could be mounted when an adversary predicted the next
challenge messages through an analysis of several previous
challenge messages [21]. The adversary can inject such a
TABLE IV: Output distribution of a playback attack against
the PKES system of each vehicle
Vehicle Algorithm LegitimateDevice
Output Distribution (mean / std) FPR
(%)
Legitimate Device #1 SDR #2 SDR
Soul
k-NN #2 Key fob
0.99
/0.64
1.67e+7
/5.97e+7
1.38e+7
/4.34e+7 0
#3 Key fob 1.08/0.67
1.41e+7
/3.43e+7
1.12e+7
/3.34e+7 0
SVM #2 Key fob
0.66
/0.72
86.93
/8.56e-14
85.68
/3.28e-15 0.7
#3 Key fob 0.7/0.61
97.37
/8.56e-14
98.09
/1.42e-13 0.7
Tiguan
k-NN #1 Key fob
16.46
/11.4
173.37
/5.99
164.79
/5.4 0
#2 Key fob 12.92/16.71
83.27
/9.99
83.27
/9.99 0
SVM #1 Key fob
25.43
/19.03
139.66
/1e-3
139.66
/3.1e-3 0
#2 Key fob 18.79/16.43
74.6
/0.31
74.6
/0.31 0
predicted challenge into the key fob and record the response
signals. Then, the adversary goes back to the vehicle and
plays back the valid response signals and unlocks the door.
SDR devices (i.e., HackRF One and USRP) are employed
to transmit the sampled signals. Fig. 13 shows the output
distributions of k-NN and SVM algorithms as a function of
SDR devices used in the simulation of playback attacks on
the Soul, when the #1 key fob was used as a training set.
Table IV shows the mean and standard deviation of output
distribution according to the vehicle and key fob. The k-NN
and SVM algorithms output an average FPR of 0% and average
FPR of 0.35% with an FNR of 0% at thresholds of 4 and 5,
respectively, in the Soul. In the case of the Tiguan, the k-NN
and SVM algorithms both output an average FPR of 0% with
an FNR of 0% at the threshold of 70. For the SVM algorithm,
it is clear that the average output distribution of the #1 SDR
device and #2 SDR is closer to the legitimate device than to
that of a digital relay attack. From these results, we understand
that when the transmission is given a sampled signal (i.e.,
playback attack) it achieves a closer output distribution to the
legitimate key fob than to when the transmission is given a
binary code (i.e., digital relay attack). Nevertheless, HODOR
still properly detects playback attacks.
E. Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS) Conditions
To show that the features used for the PKES system are
robust under an NLoS condition, we sampled UHF-band RF
signals from the key fobs placed in a pocket or backpack. In
the PKES system, a car owner is able to unlock doors without
physically producing the key fob from its storage location. The
classifier was trained with the UHF-band RF signals sampled
under an LoS condition. Fig. 14 shows the output distributions
of the k-NN and SVM algorithms as a function of where the
key fob is placed. When the key fob is placed in a backpack,
the k-NN and SVM algorithms output an FPR of 1.32% and
1.35% with an FNR of 0%. When the key fob is placed in a
pocket, the k-NN and SVM algorithms output an FPR of 1.71%
and 1.67% with an FNR of 0%. Like in previous experiments,
thresholds (ΓPKES) were respectively assigned to 4 and 5 for
each algorithm. From these results, we conclude that HODOR
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Fig. 14: Output distributions of the k-NN and SVM algorithms
as a function of where a key fob is placed
properly identifies a legitimate door unlock request even when
in an NLoS condition.
F. Attack Detection in RKE Systems
We further analyzed the UHF-band attack signal against
the RKE system of the Soul. Cryptographic attacks on RKE
systems have been extensively studied in the past decade [22],
[40], [45], [47], [61]. An adversary eavesdrops on several
valid packets and exploits the weaknesses of the cryptographic
algorithm to extract the secret key. It is also possible for
an adversary to attempt to playback the sampled UHF-band
signal. One example of a playback attack on an RKE system
is a roll-jam attack [11]. In this attack, the adversary interferes
(i.e., jams) some frequencies and plays back valid encrypted
messages.
To simulate a cryptographic attack, one remote key fob
out of three used in the experiment was chosen as legitimate.
The remaining two remote key fobs and two SDR devices
were used to simulate malicious UHF-band RF packets. In the
case of a playback attack, two SDR devices were employed
to simulate attack signals. Moreover, we tested the UHF-
band RF signals that were sampled at different distances from
where they had been sampled during training. Even though
the classifier was trained with a training set measured at a
distance of one meter, the legitimate remote key fob must still
be identified correctly within the communication range of the
RKE system. Therefore, we measured the UHF-band signals
from the legitimate key fob at a distance of 40 meters from
the RF signal receiver under LoS conditions and used this for
the test. Since SNRdB and Kurtosis are highly correlated
to the distance between the key fob and receiver, they were
excluded in this experiment. In other words, a classifier using a
different feature set (i.e., fpeak and SpectralBrightness) was
employed for the training. We denote the RKE system classifier
as CRKE . As we mentioned in Section II-A, an identical
packet was transmitted from a smart key multiple times for
reliable communication. Accordingly, HODOR verifies a newly
received signal as an attack when the number of detected
preambles exceeds
⌊
N
2
⌋
among the N received preambles.
Therefore, the maximum value of N in our experiment is five.
In addition, we set the threshold(ΓRKE) of k-NN and SVM
algorithms to 4.5 and 5, respectively. Tables V and VI show
the mean and standard deviation of output distribution for both
the cryptographic and playback attacks. Even though HODOR
TABLE V: Output distribution of a cryptographic attack
against the RKE system of the Soul
Algorithm
Legitimate
Device
Output Distribution (mean / std) FPR
(%)
#1 Key fob #2 Key fob #3 Key fob #1 SDR #2 SDR
k-NN
#1 Key fob
1.44
/2.16
77.97
/9.74
22.09
/5.37
5.27e+3
/511.58
5.21e+3
/220.04
2.38
#2 Key fob
73.91
/5.4
2.36
/3.72
39.17
5.09
6.56e+3
/433
4.53e+3
99.1
3.57
#3 Key fob
23.64
/6.48
49.8
/11.83
1.3
/1.3
5.76e+3
/846.02
5.04e+3
/185.41
1.79
SVM
#1 Key fob
1.89
/5.88
47.26
/0.75
21.09
/4.47
47.63
/7.13e-14
43.14
/5.7e-14
0
#2 Key fob
22.06
/1.78
1.53
/1.91
9.55
/1.74
32.99
/4.98e-14
29.19
/4.28e-14
0
#3 Key fob
18.14
/4.26
29.64
/4.63
1.99
/6.67
47.26
/≈0
43.02
/7.84e-14
0.6
TABLE VI: Output distribution of a playback attack against
the RKE system of the Soul
Algorithm
Legitimate
Device
Output Distribution (mean / std) FPR
(%)
Legitimate Device #1 SDR #2 SDR
k-NN
#1 Key fob
4.96
/32.43
127.65
/141.48
187.96
/105.16
0
#2 Key fob
2.84
/5.68
105.21
/27.43
40.91
/14.2
3.57
#3 Key fob
5.15
/28.55
88.75
/98.71
191.29
/174.67
1.79
SVM
#1 Key fob
1.53
/4.87
38.96
/2.28
45.08
/5.93
0
#2 Key fob
2.46
/4.31
42.04
/4.3
19.37
/5.32
3.57
#3 Key fob
1.75
/6
36.55
/4.88
34.48
/11.86
0
did not yield an FPR of 0% with an FNR of 0% on the RKE
system during experimentation, we conclude that the achieved
results are acceptable, as HODOR is designed to act as a support
to an existing authentication method in a keyless entry systems.
G. Effects of Temperature Variation
Analog signals are easily affected by external factors. In
particular, temperature variation is one of the most critical
concerns in device fingerprinting [29], [46], [53]. In order to
show that HODOR properly operates under varying tempera-
tures, UHF-band RF signals were sampled in an ice box with
dry ice to maintain a certain temperature as shown in Fig.
15a. It should be noted that this setup was only available
indoors. Owing to this, evaluation on the PKES system was
impossible, as it must occur within the vicinity of a vehicle
(i.e., outdoors). The UHF-band RF signals for training were
measured in degrees, between 20°C to -20°C in intervals of
10°C. Fig. 15b shows output distributions of the k-NN and
SVM algorithms as a function of temperature. Unlike an attack
detection, UHF-band RF signals measured in terms of varying
temperature should be recognized as legitimate. Accordingly,
this also means that the output of the RKE system classifier
should remain below a given threshold. In Fig. 15b, the output
distribution at 0°C and -20°C exceeds the threshold. This is
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(a) Experimental setup for temperature variation
(b) Output distributions of k-NN and SVM algorithms as a function of
temperature
Fig. 15: Experimental results of temperature variation
not only because of the temperature variation, but also the
severe multipath environment caused by the limited space of
the ice box. However, as we denoted in Section V-F, an RKE
packet is considered an attack only if the number of detected
preambles exceeds
⌊
N
2
⌋
among the N received preambles.
Therefore, HODOR can achieve moderate FPR under temper-
ature variation. The k-NN and SVM algorithms output an
FPR of 6.36% and 0.65% at the same threshold determined
in Section V-F. Thus, we conclude that the features used
in HODOR are operationally robust regardless of temperature
variation.
H. Battery Aging
A coin cell battery supplies stable DC voltage to the key
fob. However, as the driver uses the key fob, the supplied
voltage decreases and may lead to feature variation. For
this reason, we further evaluated feature robustness against
battery aging. In the case of the Panasonic CR2032 lithium
battery, which we selected for our evaluation, the initial voltage
was 3V, but decreased to 2.5V over time [5]. This voltage
interval occupies around 97.34% of the battery duration time.
If the voltage drops under 2.5V, the key fob does not operate
properly due to insufficient voltage supply. Therefore, using
the classifier which had been trained in advance, we tested
the UHF-band signals at a specific voltage level between 2.5V
and 3V. Fig. 16 shows the output distribution of the k-NN and
SVM algorithms as a function of voltage level. Similar to the
temperature variation experiment, output of the classifier for
the RKE system should be below a given threshold. The k-
NN and SVM algorithms both output an FPR of 0% at the
same threshold determined in Section V-F. Thus, we conclude
that the features used in HODOR are operationally regardless
of battery aging.
Fig. 16: Output distribution of k-NN and SVM algorithms as
a function of battery level
TABLE VII: Execution time of HODOR
Phase
Algorithm
k-NN SVM
Feature
Extraction
(FSK / ASK)
fpeak 4ms / 3.85ms
foffsetc 4ms / 3.55ms
SNRdB 130ms / 94ms
Kurtosis 20ms / 16.2ms
Spec.Brightness 5ms / 3.73ms
NPC
(FSK / ASK)
CPKES 55ms / 60ms 43ms / 45.5ms
CRKE 50ms / 52ms 32ms / 34ms
Attack Detection
(FSK / ASK)
CPKES 4.8ms / 4.94ms .038ms / .04ms
CRKE 3.8ms / 4ms .04ms / .07ms
I. Execution Time
We implemented the functions that principally contribute to
the total execution time of HODOR. We selected the Raspberry-
pi 3B single-board computer [56] as a reference hardware
platform. This platform is based on a quad core 1.4GHz
Cortex-A53 (ARMv8) with 1GB RAM. Table VII shows the
execution time for each basic function used in HODOR, which
were implemented via Python programming. The classifiers
should be trained and cross-validated in advance. Owing to
this, the time for these two processes can be disregarded when
it comes to the operation time for verifying a door unlock
request. The results show that the k-NN algorithm takes longer
to detect attacks. As a result, the total operation time for the
verification of the PKES system using FSK modulation is
163.8ms and 159.038ms in the k-NN and SVM algorithms,
respectively. These are the sum of feature extraction and attack
detection processes. In addition, the RKE system using FSK
modulation requires 12.8ms and 9.04ms in the k-NN and
SVM algorithms, respectively. In ASK modulation, the total
amount of operation time for the verification of the PKES
system using ASK modulation is 126.27ms and 121.37ms
in the k-NN and SVM algorithms, respectively. In addition,
the RKE system using ASK modulation requires 15.13ms
and 11.2ms in the k-NN and SVM algorithms, respectively.
For the feature extraction phase, similar execution times were
obtained because the numbers of samples for both ASK &
FSK modulations were similar to each other. In other words,
the duration of the preamble region from which the features
are extracted is similar regardless of the modulation schemes.
Regarding the NPC and Attack Detection phases, HODOR has
12
Fig. 17: Scatter plot of the top two features of the Soul as a function of an attack scenario: (a) Single-band relay attack, (b)
Amplification attack, (c) Digital relay attack, (d) Playback attack
different execution times that correspond to the modulation
schemes. In HODOR, the number of used features are differ-
ent depending on modulation schemes. Because HODOR uses
one additional feature, foffsetc , for ASK-modulated signals,
attack detection time for ASK modulation is longer than FSK
modulation. However, since the ASK-modulated signal has a
much shorter execution time for feature extraction, the total
execution time of the ASK-modulated signal is shorter than the
FKS-modulated signal. According to [7], humans cannot easily
recognize a delay of less than 500ms. Thus, it is expected that
HODOR would be effective as a support mechanism to existing
keyless entry systems without creating a noticeable delay on
the user end.
J. Feature Importance
We minimized the feature set through the exhaustive search
in Section IV. In this subsection, we further evaluated the
feature importance as a function of each attack scenario. We
employed the Relief algorithm, which is a unique family of
filter-style feature-selection algorithms [50]. A key idea of the
Relief algorithm is to estimate the quality of features according
to how well their values distinguish between instances near
to each other. Based on the MATLAB implementation of the
relieff function, we ranked the features in each attack
detection experiment. Table VIII shows the rankings of the
features as a function of each attack scenario. The distribution
of the top two features in each attack scenario are represented
in Fig. 17. In a single-band relay and amplification attack,
SNRdB and kurtosis are effective features to detect an attack.
In an amplification attack, even when the adversaries adjust
the SNR level to the legitimate signal, HODOR can effectively
differentiate the attack signals using the kurtosis feature. In a
digital relay attack, fpeak has a major role. This is because
of the clock difference between the key fob and the SDRs
(i.e., USRP and HackRF). Though not as effective as fpeak,
kurtosis is also useful to detect a digital relay attack. In a play-
back attack, due to the quantization error, spectral brightness
and kurtosis are both effective features to differentiate attack
signals.
K. Advanced Dual-Band Relay Attacks
In this subsection, we assumed the presence of an
advanced dual-band relay attack adversary, extending the
TABLE VIII: Feature importance as a function of attack
scenario
Attack
Scenario
Single-band
Relay Attack
Amplification
Attack
Digital Relay
Attack
Playback
Attack
Rank
1 SNR Kurtosis fpeak
Spec.
Brightness
2 Kurtosis SNR Kurtosis Kurtosis
3
Spec.
Brightness
Spec.
Brightness
Spec.
Brightness
fpeak
4 fpeak fpeak SNR SNR
previous experimental setup in Section V-C. Advanced
adversaries are equipped with analog filters or an SDR device
with a high sample rate.
1) Amplification attacks using analog filters: Advanced
dual-band relay adversaries can attempt to make a low value
for kurtosis by using an amplifier with a pre- and post-analog
bandpass filter (BPF). In this attack scenario, adversaries use
pre- and post- analog filters to reduce unwanted noise. An
analog filter is a circuit made of analog components such as
resistors, capacitors, inductors, and op amps. Digital filters are
often embedded in a chip that operates on digital signals,
such as an MCU or DSP. Analog filters are fairly simple
but increase in complexity for narrow bandwidth and precise
roll-off. In contrast, digital filters, which are employed in
HODOR can be more precise in filtering, but the signal must be
digitally sampled. Among the bandpass filters of MiniCircuits,
we used the one with the bandwidth most relevant to the
UHF band [9]. The low and high cut-off frequencies of the
bandpass filter are 400MHz and 510MHz, respectively. Fig. 18
shows the amplifier used with the BPF in our evaluation. The
pre-/post-bandpass filters were connected to the input/output
port of each amplifier. We conducted the same experiment as
the one used in the amplification attack. Fig. 19 shows the
output distributions of the k-NN and SVM algorithms as a
function of the amplifiers. As seen in the figure, compared
to the amplification attack without analog filters (Fig. 10),
the normalized output distance/score is slightly closer to the
legitimate case. Nevertheless, the k-NN and SVM algorithms
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Fig. 18: Experimental setup for amplification attack simulation
using pre/post-analog filter on the key fob side
Fig. 19: Output distribution of the k-NN and SVM algorithms
as a function of an amplifier under the advanced amplification
attack scenario
both output an FPR of 0% and FNR of 0% at thresholds
(ΓPKES) of 4 and 5, respectively. Since the bandpass filter
has a larger bandwidth (110MHz) than HODOR (30kHz),
filtered noise has a negligible effect on the performance of
HODOR. This is because the analog bandpass filter has a larger
bandwidth than the digital bandpass filter of HODOR, which
still amplifies the noise signals within the bandwidth of the
digital bandpass filter and corrupts the value of kurtosis. In
addition, if adversaries use the digital bandpass filter with a
narrower bandwidth than that of HODOR, it accompanies both
the ADC and DAC processes which corrupt the kurtosis and
spectral brightness. This corruption can be observed in the
evaluation results of the playback attack detection. As a result,
we concluded that HODOR is able to detect an amplification
attack even with pre-/post-analog filters.
2) Playback attack with high sample rate: We also assumed
the presence of an adversary with strong PHY-layer sampling
capabilities in addition to the amplification adversaries using
the analog filter. To evaluate HODOR with a high sample
capability, we used the maximum sampling rate of the USRP
X310 used in our evaluation. Because the Ethernet interface
did not support the maximum sample rate, we employed a
new PCIe x4 interface that can tolerate 200M samples/s on
baseband signals [6]. Through the PCIe X4 interface, the
USRP X310 was connected with a desktop where an Intel
i7-7700 3.6GHz processor CPU with 16G RAM and a 512GB
SSD were installed.
We generated UHF-band signals with high samples by
using the USRP X310. HODOR captured the generated signals
with a sample rate of 5MS/s by using HackRF One. After
Fig. 20: Output distribution of k-NN and SVM algorithms as
a function of sample rate
that, HODOR analyzed the features of the captured signals
to compare the differences with those from a legitimate key
fob. Considering the 200MHz of master clock rates (MCR)
supported on the USRP X310, its sample rates must be an
integer decimation rate of the MCR [8]. Accordingly, we
performed experiments with sample rates of 10MS/s, 25MS/s,
50MS/s, and 100MS/s. Theoretically, 200MS/s is also possible
on the USRP X310, but the signals with a sample rate of
200MS/s cannot be properly generated by our experimental
setup. It seems that higher performing hardware is required.
Fig. 20 shows the output distribution of the attack with a high
sample rate. As shown in the Fig. 20, the attacks with a higher
sample rate up to 25MS/s have a much closer output distance
to those with legitimate signals. Rather, the output distance
increases as the sample rate exceeds 50MS/s. We conclude that
a higher sample rate is not helpful to impersonate a legitimate
signal. However, it should be noted that this result is from an
experiment done with a software-defined radio (SDR) device.
For further research on high sample rate attacks, more state-
of-the-art equipment is required, such as a pair of arbitrary
function generators and a tunable mixer.
L. Dynamic Channel Conditions
A dynamic condition may decrease the performance of
HODOR in identifying a legitimate key fob. We further eval-
uated HODOR under additional conditions, such as an under-
ground parking lot and a roadside parking space as shown
in Fig. 21. The underground parking lot had enough spaces
for approximately 700 cars, and many cars were frequently
entering and leaving the facility. Compared with an outdoor
parking lot, it is expected that a greater number of mul-
tipath components are present because of the ceiling and
thick concrete pillars, which can affect the performance of
HODOR. In addition, we evaluated HODOR when the vehicle
was parked on the road. This place was very crowded with
pedestrians and moving vehicles. Furthermore, our evaluation
was conducted during the most crowded hours of the day.
For both environments, we placed the key fob in a backpack.
Fig. 22 shows the output distribution of the k-NN and SVM
algorithms as a function of place where the vehicle was parked.
When the vehicle is parked in the underground parking lot,
the k-NN and SVM algorithms output an FPR of 5% and
4% with an FNR of 0%. When the vehicle is parked in a
roadside parking space, the k-NN and SVM algorithms output
an FPR of 2% and 3% with an FNR of 0%. We should note
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(a) (b)
Fig. 21: Dynamic environment: (a) The vehicle parked in an
underground parking lot, (b) The vehicle parked in a street
parking space
Fig. 22: Output distribution of k-NN and SVM algorithms as
a function of parking space
that we used the same values for the threshold, ΓPKES , as
used in other evaluations. As can be seen in Fig. 14, HODOR
displays weaker performance in dynamic environments than in
static environments. It seems that interference due to multipath
components affects the features that are analyzed in HODOR
even though their RF signals originate from a legitimated
key fob. However, we believe that this result is significantly
meaningful, as it demonstrates that HODOR is able to identify a
legitimate key fob even within a dynamic environment. Finally,
we further evaluated feature importance under NLoS channel
conditions, including dynamic environments. In the results, the
peak frequency is the most salient feature followed by kurtosis,
SNR, and spectral brightness, in that order.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we introduce existing demonstrations of
attacks on keyless entry systems and device fingerprint tech-
niques that have been proposed in previous studies.
A. Attacks on Keyless Entry Systems
Early keyless entry systems were designed without security
considerations. More specifically, RKE systems deployed in
Mercedes-Benz vehicles manufactured in the early 2000s still
used fixed codes [40]. This means that these vehicles were
vulnerable to replay attacks. To prevent replay attacks, a
rolling code system using cryptography and a counter was
installed in the RKE system. Although the rolling code pro-
vides an adequate level of security, several studies [35], [48]
demonstrated the cryptographic weakness of the KEELOQ
system via a cryptographic analysis. For example, Garcia et al.
[40] performed a comprehensive survey and security analysis
of the RKE system implemented in vehicles manufactured
by Volkswagen. The authors describe various types of RKE
systems used in Volkswagen vehicles, and revealed that they
were using a single worldwide secret key. Moreover, Benadjila
et al. [22] demonstrate attacks on RKE systems using the
Hitag-2 cryptographic algorithm. The authors demonstrate that
it is possible to extract the rogue key (a.k.a. not the true secret
key), while, in turn, exploiting a weakness of the Hitag-2
cryptographic algorithm. More recent studies further reveal a
weakness of the AUT64 automotive cryptographic algorithm.
In [45], the authors demonstrate the full details of AUT64
including a complete specification and analysis of a block
cipher. The authors propose two key-recovery attacks based
on cryptographic weakness. In addition to studies based on
the weaknesses of cryptographic algorithms, roll jam attacks
on RKE systems have also been studied [67]. In this type of
attack, an adversary avoids being discovered by the victim
while jamming and eavesdropping, and at the same time,
obtains a valid rolling code. In this scenario, the car owner
would not suspect an attack despite having pressed the button
on their key fob twice to unlock the doors.
Alrabady et al. [20] also analyze potential attacks on PKES
systems. The authors demonstrate several potential attacks
on passive entry systems and propose solutions to protect
vehicles from such attacks. However, to deploy these proposed
solutions, the frequency band of the key fob and the vehicle
would have to be altered, which forces the previous PKES
system to be re-designed. The same authors also analyzed
various types of security attacks against keyless entry systems
and compared the attacks in terms of the vulnerability of the
security mechanism deployed on the system, level of difficulty
to mount the attacks, and equipment needed for the attacks
[21]. Francillon et al. [38] pragmatically show a different type
of attack on PKES systems, the so-called relay attack. The
authors performed a comprehensive experiment and proposed
two types of attack scenarios: wired and wireless relay attacks.
In addition, [18] showed a similar but still different type
of relay attack on PKES systems. In this work, adversaries
were presumed to be extracting binary codes from RF signals
and relaying these to another location. Although there is a
maximum receiving time delay allowance in the PKES system,
the authors showed that it was possible to overcome this
constraint using cheap devices. Finally, in real car theft cases
[10], [13], it was revealed that the adversaries amplified both
the LF-band and UHF-band signals to mount a relay attack
known as an amplification attack.
B. RF Device Fingerprinting
Depending on the signal region used to extract fingerprints,
approaches can be categorized as transient-based, modulation-
based, or other approaches [32]. Transient-based approaches
use the turn-on/off transient of an RF signal for device iden-
tification. This approach has been applied to the identification
of VHF FM transceivers or intrusion detection in a WLAN
environment [36], [43]. However, transient signals have been
reportedly acquired at distances close to the front-end antenna
(10 ∼ 20cm), and this is unfeasible in keyless entry systems.
Modulation-based approaches extract features from the base
band signal. In this study, the classifier achieves a classification
error rate of 3% and 0.34% for the k-NN and SVM classifiers,
respectively. However, to achieve this error rate, a high-end
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vector signal analyzer [12] is necessary for signal acquisition.
Other approaches considered other regions of the RF sig-
nals to extract the fingerprints, such as the preamble of the
packet. As such, Suski et al. [60] proposed a power spectrum
density of the packet preamble to extract fingerprints. Jun et
al. [46] also presented BlueID, which fingerprints the clock
of a Bluetooth device. BlueID estimates the clock skew of a
Bluetooth device applying the Generalized Hough Transform
(GHT). In this work, 200 received preambles are required even
though the time-stamp value is not required to calculate a clock
skew. In a keyless entry system, however, the maximum five
preambles can be received for attack detection. Recently, the
authors of [27] proposed an RF-PUF which exploits the unique
hardware characteristics of an RF device to an authenticated
device. The main concept of HODOR is similar to that of
an RF-PUF, given that both analyze RF signals to develop
a security method, such as authentication or identification.
However, in contrast to HODOR, multiple wireless devices used
in an RF-PUF were simulated based on software implemen-
tation. HODOR was evaluated using physical hardware rather
than simulations in environments while considering possible
scenarios in the PKES system.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. HODOR and Security
A threshold is a trade-off parameter in HODOR. If the output
score of a UHF-band signal and its features is larger than
the threshold, HODOR would determine that the signal is not
from a legitimate key fob. In addition, HODOR is designed
with a sufficiently large threshold so that it can tolerate some
degree of error. For example, the environments under an NLoS
channel and high-temperature variation cause a high noise
level, and HODOR should tolerate a feature variation that occurs
under these conditions. Because of this large threshold, on
the other hand, HODOR might accept a UHF-band signal even
if its features are not perfectly impersonated. We analyzed
the difficulties of feature impersonation to additionally discuss
HODOR’s security in the following subsection.
B. Feature Impersonation
Difficulty of feature impersonation is another crucial factor
in evaluating the security level of HODOR. Since HODOR
employs multiple features for attack detection, the degree of
feature impersonation difficulty should be discussed separately.
Peak frequency. The peak frequency represents the bit
time characteristics of an individual device. In a digital re-
lay attack and cryptographic attack, the peak frequency was
clearly different between attack signals and legitimate signals.
Because every RF device has a different bit time, it is possible
to identify RF devices based on their bit time. Moreover, the
peak frequency enables HODOR to identify RF devices even if
they have identical components with each other. On the other
hand, the playback attack that records and playbacks UHF-
band signals from a legitimate key fob is able to similarly
impersonate the peak frequency. However, even though the
peak frequency was successfully impersonated by the playback
attack, it fails to impersonate the spectral brightness and
kurtosis which are affected by the ADC and DAC process.
SNR. Even though the SNR feature is effective in detecting
single-band relay attacks, an adversary can impersonate the
SNR of a legitimate signal by using an amplifier or by varying
the distance from the vehicle. However, the both methods
also affect kurtosis similar to the ways to impersonate the
peak frequency feature. Using an amplifier especially increases
noise level as well as the baseband signal level. Due to this
amplified noise level, it is difficult to impersonate kurtosis
while also impersonating SNR. In addition, channel condition
between the two adversaries affect the kurtosis feature. An
ideal analog filter would perfectly amplify only the baseband
signal level, and not noise level. However, it is very difficult to
design the ideal analog filter in practice because of the analog
circuit complexity.
Spectral Brightness. The spectral brightness feature rep-
resents the amount of energy in a high-frequency region of
signals. This feature is very helpful to detect attacks where new
ADC and DAC processes occurs, such as in a playback attack.
However, the spectral brightness of each key fob has a similar
value. As a result, the attacks must be executed with identical
components as the target key fob in order to impersonate the
spectral brightness feature. However, different devices have
different bit times that are represented by the peak frequency
feature.
Kurtosis. The kurtosis feature was the most salient feature
across the series of evaluations. Although the kurtosis feature
is not helpful to detect the digital relay attack using identical
components (i.e., other key fobs), it outperforms when the
single-band relay attack and amplification attack are detected.
However, the kurtosis feature of each key fob is similarly
distributed as spectral brightness. This implies that an attack
device with identical components as a target key fob is required
to impersonate its kurtosis feature. Even if two devices are
designed with identical components, as mentioned above, they
have different bit times with each other, which are represented
by peak frequency. Accordingly, if the kurtosis feature is
successfully impersonated by using a device with identical
components, its attack would be detected based on the different
peak frequency of an attack signal.
C. Concern for Practicality
Although we evaluated HODOR under various environmen-
tal conditions, some results seem still insufficient for the
practical usage of HODOR. It has been shown that HODOR
has a relatively high FPR under dynamic conditions and
temperature variation. Other than the conditions where we
evaluated HODOR, more extreme environments certainly do
exist that adversely affect accuracy. For this reason, HODOR
should be further studied to develop additional features and
algorithms that properly operate even in extreme environments.
Subsequently, other processes will be performed together with
HODOR to unlock doors. Regarding the total execution time
for a door unlock command, HODOR should also be improved
to shorten execution time. Otherwise, a driver may sense a
lag when he/she attempts to unlock the doors. As a result,
HODOR should be further studied to resolve these practical
issues. Through our future research, it is expected that HODOR
will improve and achieve the requirements for practical usage.
D. Scalability
The concept that analyzes RF signals can be applied to
other modulations for secure proximity and distance measure-
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ment. However, such analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper and further research on the characteristics of baseband
signals generated by other modulations is required. We suspect
that HODOR may be applicable in other modulations for
secure proximity and distance measurement since the hardware
characteristics of an attack device and channel conditions affect
the features.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented HODOR as a sub-authentication
system that supports manufacturer-installed support systems
to prevent keyless entry system car theft. HODOR is an RF-
fingerprinting method that distinguishes a legitimate door un-
lock request from a malicious attempt. Through our evaluation,
we showed that HODOR is able to effectively detect simulated
attacks that are defined in our attack model, while reducing the
number of erroneous detection occurrences (i.e., false alarms).
Furthermore, we found a set of suitable features in a number
of environmental conditions, such as temperature variation,
battery aging, and NLoS conditions, that make it possible for
HODOR to properly operate in real-life environments. Finally,
one especially noteworthy merit of HODOR is its design. It is
designed such that it can be applied into an existing system
without any hardware modifications. The only requirement for
successful implementation is to add a device to sample UHF-
band RF signals and analyze them. This novel characteristic
of our method means that HODOR improves security without
creating additional cumbersome or inconvenient processes for
the user.
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